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I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review 
Industrial Commission Board of Review decisions by virtue of The 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Section 63-466-16. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Was the Board of Review decision based on substantial 
evidence sufficient to support its conclusions? 
B. Was the Board of Review's application of facts to law 
within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality? 
C. Did the board of review act arbitrarily in issuing a 
decision contrary to applicable law? 
D. Did the Board of Review violate equal protection by 
drawing an unreasonable classification with no rational relation 
to the Employment Security Act, or by giving disparate treatment 
to a member of a class on irrational bases with no relation to 
the Employment Security Act? 
E. Did the Board of Review violate due process by applying 
the Unemployment Security Act in a manner arbitrary, unreasonable 
and with no rational relation to that Act? 
III. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
A. United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
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reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shalT any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
B. Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
C. Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 24. 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
D. Utah Employment Security Act, Utah Code Ann. Sections 
35-4-2, 35-4-5(b)(1). 
35-4-2: Public Policy - General Welfare requires 
creation of unemployment reserves - employment offices. 
- As a guide to the interpretation and application of 
this act, the public policy of this state is declared 
to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to 
unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, 
and welfare of the people of this state. Unemployment 
is therefore a subject of general interest and concern 
which requires appropriate action by the legislature to 
prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now 
so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed 
worker and his family. The achievement of social 
security requires protection against this greatest 
hazard of our economic life. This objective can be 
furthered by operating free public employment offices 
in affiliation with a nation-wide system of employment 
services, by devising appropriate methods for reducing 
the volume of unemployment and by the systematic 
accumulation of funds during periods of employment from 
which benefits may be paid for periods of unemployment, 
thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the 
serious social consequences of unemployment. The 
legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered 
judgment the public good, and the general welfare of 
the citizens of this state require the enactment of 
this measure, under the police power of the state, for 
the establishment and maintenance of free public 
employment offices and for the compulsory setting aside 
of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of 
unemployed persons. 
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35-4-5. Ineligibility for benefits. 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for 
purposes of establishing a waiting%period: 
* * * 
(b)(1): For the week in which the claimant was 
discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in 
connection with employment, not constituting a crime, 
which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to 
the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the 
commission, and thereafter until the claimant has 
earned an amount equal to at least six times the 
claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered 
employment. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Claimant, Kevin R. Johnson, was discharged as an employee of 
Respondent Morton Thiokol. He applied for and was allowed 
unemployment compensation by the Utah Department of Employment 
Security. Morton Thiokol appealed the Department of Employment 
Security's decision to the Department of Employment Security 
Appeals Tribunal. Administrative Law Judge Norman Barnes heard 
the appeal, and upheld the decision of the Department of 
Employment Security, allowing benefits to Claimant Johnson. 
Morton Thiokol appealed the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
to the Industrial Commission Board of Review. 
The Board of Review issued a first decision, No. 88-BR-086, 
on May 10, 1988. Claimant and Claimant's counsel were not given 
proper notice of that appeal, however, so the Board granted 
Claimant's motion to reconsider. The Board accepted written 
argument from Claimant and Morton Thiokol, and sua sponte 
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remanded the case to the Administrative Law Judge for the taking 
of additional evidence. The hearing on remand was held October 
26, 1988. The Board of Review then issued its final decision on 
December 30th, 1988. The final Board of Review decision upheld 
its May 10, 1988 decision reversing the Administrative Law Judge, 
denying Claimant unemployment compensation, and requiring an 
overpayment to be deducted from any future benefits payable to 
him during that benefit year. Claimant seeks review of the Board 
of Review decision. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Claimant Kevin R. Johnson was an employee of Morton Thiokol, 
Inc. Administrative Law Judge Hearing February 11, 1988 
(Hearing), pg. 4. Johnson was involved in an auto accident while 
driving a company truck on company time. Hearing, pg 5, 10. 
Johnson was absolved of any fault in the accident, but was drug 
tested pursuant to a Morton Thiokol policy that mandates drug 
testing after any job related auto accident after which the 
employee needs medical attention. 
Johnson's drug test after the auto accident, taken on 
September 21, 1987, showed positive for marijuana at 128 
nanograms per milliliter. Administrative Law Judge Hearing on 
Remand, October 26, 1988 (Remand), pg. 23. Based on that 
positive test, Johnson was given a three day disciplinary 
suspension, counseling, and 12 months of probation in which he 
might be subjected to random drug testing. Hearing, pp. 5, 8. 
Johnson was drug tested again 65 days later, on November 25, 
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1987, and showed 25 nanograms per milliliter of marijuana 
metabolites. Remand, pg. 24. 20 nanograms is the threshold for 
a positive test. Id. Based on the second positive test which 
showed 25 nanograms, Johnson was discharged from his employment 
with Morton Thiokol. Hearing, pg. 5. 
Johnson's personnel file showed him to be a satisfactory 
employee. Hearing, pg. 9. Morton Thiokol made no claim that 
Johnson used marijuana on the job or reported to work under its 
influence. Hearing, pp. 9-10. Johnson testified he never used 
marijuana on company premises or company time, and never reported 
to work under its influence. Hearing, pg. 11. He further 
testified he used no marijuana at all after the auto accident and 
the first drug test. Hearing, pg. 12. He testified that any 
exposure to marijuana he encountered would be from passive 
inhalation of his roommates' smoke. Hearing, pg. 13. Morton 
Thiokol's personnel representative, however, testified Morton 
Thiokol's test procedure was set-up through consultants so that 
passive inhalation would not result in a positive test. Hearing, 
pg. 13. 
Morton Thiokol made no claim that the auto accident was the 
result of marijuana use by Johnson. Hearing, pg. 6. To the 
contrary, Johnson's supervisor reported that Johnson did not 
appear to be under the influence of marijuana at the time of the 
accident. Hearing, pg. 6. Morton Thiokol made no claim that 
Johnson acted against its interest in any way. Hearing, pg. 8. 
The sole reason Johnson was discharged from employment was the 
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second positive test. Hearing, pg. 5. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. THE BOARD OF REVIEW DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS NOT REASONABLE OR RATIONAL 
The Board of Review's findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence and must be overturned. The Board of Review 
based its findings on the testimony of Morton Thiokol's in-house 
physician• In so doing, the Board of Review disregarded the 
Claimant's testimony which the Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
found to be credible, disregarded the bias of Morton Thiokol's 
physician and the conflicts in his own testimony, and disregarded 
the testimony of a more credible and qualified expert. 
Also, the Board of Review decision was not within the bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality. First, the mere numbers of 
the test results compel the conclusion that Johnson had ceased 
marijuana use. Second, the Board of Review's decision that even 
passive inhalation is sufficient grounds for denial is plainly 
irrational. Finally, off the job marijuana use should be no 
concern of Morton Thiokol's or at least no concern of the 
Department of Unemployment Security in granting unemployment 
compensation. 
B. THE BOARD OF REVIEW ACTED ARBITRARILY IN ISSUING A 
DECISION CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
established an analysis for Boards of Review to follow in 
determining an applicant's qualification for unemployment 
compensation. The Board of Review arbitrarily ignored these 
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precedents and the analysis they require in denying Johnson 
benefits. Those precedents require the Board of Review to find 
the Claimant's culpability, knowledge and control sufficient for 
a rightful denial of unemployment compensation. Application of 
Johnson's case to the analysis established by this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court compels reversal of the Board of Review 
decision. 
The Board of Review ruled that any positive test for 
marijuana is grounds for denial of unemployment benefits, 
regardless of the claimant's culpability, knowledge and control. 
This ignores logic, rationality, fairness and the Board of 
Review's obligation to act in accord with standards set by 
established precedent. This arbitrary Board of Review action 
should be reversed. 
C. THE BOARD OF REVIEW VIOLATED STATE AND FEDERAL 
GUARANTEES OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 
The Board of Review's decision violates state and federal 
equal protection. These Constitutional guarantees may be 
violated both in enacting statutes &nd rules, and in their 
execution by government officials. Administrative bodies are 
subject to the limitations of equal protection. Here, the Board 
of Review's flawed application of an otherwise constitutionally 
valid statute violated equal protection. 
First, classifications and the different treatment given the 
classes must be rationally related to the purpose of the statute. 
The Board of Review's decision has the effect of creating a 
separate class of all employees fired for positive drug tests 
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whose drug use does not relate to work performance. All other 
claimants will be reviewed under the culpability, knowledge and 
control standard established by this Court, Those, such as 
Johnson, with positive drug tests will be denied compensation 
merely on the result of the test, despite the many circumstances 
which may give rise to a positive test, and despite the fact that 
any drug use may have had no negative impact on the employer. 
This simply has no rational and just relationship to the purpose 
of the employment compensation statutes and rules. Therefore, 
the only class which may be fashioned with a rational 
relationship to the purposes of the Employment Security Act is 
the class comprised of all employees, otherwise qualified, who 
are challenged as having been terminated for just cause. 
Having defined the class, the law must be applied equally to 
all class members. All other members of the class are judged on 
a standard which requires some conduct of the claimant which 
injured the employer in its business, i.e., some job related 
conduct. To deny benefits to Johnson for conduct not related to 
the job is an irrational distinction not related to the purpose 
of the statute, and violates equal protection. 
D, THE BOARD OF REVIEW DECISION VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS 
Substantive due process protects individuals from arbitrary 
action of state administrative agencies. The Board of Review 
decision holds that mere association with marijuana users is 
sufficient grounds for denial of unemployment compensation. That 
is arbitrary and unreasonable and a denial of due process. 
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Second, to deny benefits to Johnson for conduct not related to 
his job performance or the interest of the employer is arbitrary, 
irrational and unrelated to the purpose of the Employment 
Security Act. Finally, the Board of Review's failure to properly 
apply applicable law is arbitrary, unreasonable, and a violation 
of due process. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE BOARD OF REVIEW DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS NOT REASONABLE OR RATIONAL 
The Board of Review decision to reverse the award of 
benefits by the ALJ should be overturned by this Court and 
remanded to the Board of Review to reinstate the prior award of 
employment compensation. Decisions of the Utah Industrial 
Commission Boards of Review are reviewed by an intermediate 
standard, under which the Court must determine if the Board of 
Review decision was "within the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Champlin Petroleum v. Department of Employment 
Security, 744 P.2d 330, 331 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Sevier County 
Board of Ed. v. Board of Review. 701 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1985). 
The Court's review of the facts is "limited to a determination of 
whether the Commission's findings are supported by substantial 
evidence." Logan Hospital v. Board of Review, 723 P.2d 427, 429 
(Utah 1986). Here, The Board of Review's decision is based on 
evidence which no reasonable person could find to be credible, in 
direct conflict with contrary findings of the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ). The application of law to those facts is logically 
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strained and apparently oriented to a preconceived result. The 
decision, therefore, must be overturned as unreasonable and 
irrational. 
The Board of Review's findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence and must be overturned. The Board of Review 
based its findings on the testimony of Morton Thiokol's in-house 
physician. In so doing, the Board of Review disregarded the 
Claimant's testimony which the ALJ found to be credible, 
disregarded the bias of Morton Thiokol's physician and the 
conflicts in his own testimony, and disregarded the testimony of 
a more credible and qualified expert. 
In administrative proceedings of the Department of 
Employment Security, the hearing at which witnesses are sworn and 
testimony is taken is conducted before an ALJ. That hearing 
serves the trial court function. The ALJ is the trier of fact, 
and should be accorded the deference given to trial courts as 
triers of fact in other proceedings. See Young v. Board of 
Review, 731 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1986) (findings of administrative 
law judge will not be substituted where* supported by ample 
evidence); Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of Review, 723 P.2d at 
428 (it is for administrative agency to choose between 
conflicting facts); Lane v. Board of Review, 727 P.2d 206 (Utah 
1986) (giving findings of administrative law judge deference over 
findings of board of review). 
Here, the ALT witnessed Johnson's testimony that he had not 
used marijuana since before September 1987, the date of the first 
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positive test. The ALJ found that testimony to be credible, 
finding that claimant "denied any consumption of marijuana since 
September and attributes the positive test to passive 
inhalation." Administrative Law Judge Decision (ALJ Dec.) pg. 2. 
The ALJ further found Johnson "emphatically denies using 
marijuana after September, 1987." ALJ Dec. pg. 3. Morton 
Thiokol did not refute that testimony, but rather admitted they 
"are not stating when Mr. Johnson took the substance. All our 
tests show is there was a substance in his system." Hearing, 
Testimony of Jim Fox, pg. 9. The ALJ thus concluded "the 
claimant was not discharged from his employment for just cause or 
for an act or omission in connection with employment that was 
deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse to the employer's 
rightful interests." ALJ Dec. pg. 3. 
The Board of Review disregarded the ALJ's findings and found 
Johnson's testimony that he ceased marijuana use after the first 
test to not be credible. Board of Review Decision No. 88-BR-428, 
pg. 2. The Board of Review did so on the basis of a cold record, 
without deference to the ALJ's ability as trier of fact to weigh 
Johnson's credibility face to face. Rather, it based its 
decision on the strained logic that if Johnson lived with 
marijuana users, he must use marijuana himself, and that the 
remaining minimal presence of marijuana in Johnson's system was 
sufficient evidence of continued use. That reasoning does not 
give just deference to the ALJ's findings and is not based on 
evidence of any substance. The Board of Review's findings should 
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thus be overturned. 
The Board of Review also based its decision on the testimony 
of Morton Thiokol's in-house physician. Before issuing its final 
decision the Board of Review remanded the matter to the ALJ for 
more fact taking. Board of Review Decision No. 88-BR-086, 
September 27, 1988. The Board of Review requested the Board to 
subpoena Dr. Ellwood Loveridge, Director of Scientific Support 
Services of the Salt Lake County Health Department, to provide 
information regarding drug testing and drug metabolism, and 
requested Morton Thiokol to provide better evidence of its 
testing procedures and Johnson's tests specifically. Id. Dr. 
Loveridge was properly subpoenaed and attended. Administrative 
Law Judge Remand Hearing (Remand), pg. 2. However, Morton 
Thiokol did not properly prepare its hearing representative, so 
its hearing representative came to the hearing with no additional 
evidence. Remand, pg. 4. At the ALJ's request, Morton Thiokol's 
in-house physician was contacted by conference telephone to 
provide some of the information Morton Thiokol was to have 
prepared for the remand hearing. Remand, pg. 5. 
Morton Thiokol's in-house physician, Dr. Kerr, was 
originally called to testify as to Morton Thiokol's testing 
procedure, and as to Johnson's test results, so Dr. Loveridge 
would have accurate information on which to opine. Remand, pp. 
6-7 & 20-24. However, as the examination progressed, Dr. Kerr 
was put in the position of being both a fact witness and an 
expert witness as to his own facts. Remand, pp. 24-28. Dr. Kerr 
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is Morton Thiokol's Medical Director, in charge of supervising 
the drug tests and the drug screening program• Administrative 
Law Judge Hearing (Hearing), pg. 6; Remand, pp. 21-22. He 
therefore testified as to the propriety and fairness of his own 
testing program. His bias was clear in his conflicting 
testimony, and brings into question the credibility of his 
opinions. 
Dr. Kerr first testified that the results of Johnson's first 
test in September showed a presence of marijuana metabolites of 
128 nanograms per milliliters. Remand, pg. 23. Johnson was 
tested 65 days later and showed the presence of 25 nanograms per 
milliliter. Id. 20 nanograms per milliliter is considered a 
positive test result. Id. 
Dr. Kerr went on to testify that he is familiar with human 
toxicology, but he is not a specialist in that field. Remand, 
pg. 24. He testified, however, he has knowledge of the length of 
time marijuana residue remains in the body. Remand, pg 25. He 
testified "[i]t is one of the longer lasting substances that can 
be detected." Id. And, after chronic use, it "can be detected 
by the tests we [Morton Thiokol] are using for several weeks 
after its usage is discontinued." Id. Dr. Kerr then responded 
to an inquiry about an experiment which showed positive results 
for up to 81 days after marijuana ingestion. He testified 81 
days "would fit into the range of several weeks that I have in 
mind, yes." Id. 
Dr. Kerr testified that Johnson's reduction from 128 to 2 5 
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nanograms per milliliter would be considered a significant 
reduction. Id. As to what happened between the two tests to 
cause the reduction, Dr. Kerr testified: 
Well as I said it is a significant lower result, which 
could mean decreased or discontinued use of the 
substance. We can't predict how long before that 25 
nanogram level was found the last exposure to marijuana 
occurred. I don't know of any way to predict that 
other than we do know there is a prolonged time in 
which it remains positive. 
Remand, pg. 26 (emphasis added). Then in response to the 
specific question of whether the claimant not have used marijuana 
between the first and second tests, Dr. Kerr reversed his prior 
responses, answering: 
No, because we are talking there about, I believe, 2 
1/2 months. I know of nothing to indicate that 
prolonged positive result after discontinued use. 
Remand, pg. 26. He testified that "4 to 6 weeks is as long as I 
am aware of any studies confirming [marijuana metabolites in 
urine]." Asked if he recalled studies longer than 24 days, he 
testified: "Not that I am personally acquainted with." Remand, 
pp. 27-28. 
In its final decision the Board of Review disregarded Dr. 
Kerr's testimony that a person could test positive for marijuana 
use after 81 days of abstinence. It similarly disregarded Dr. 
Kerr's testimony that the dramatic decrease in the level of 
Johnson's test results could mean discontinued use of marijuana, 
and his testimony that they "can't predict how long before that 
25 nanogram level was found the last exposure to marijuana 
occurred." Remand, pg. 26; See 88-BR-428, pg. 2. In short, the 
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Board of Review chose selectively among Dr. Kerr's biased, 
conflicting testimony to find evidence to support its position. 
To the contrary, the weight of Dr. Kerr's testimony compels the 
conclusion that a 25 nanogram test result found 65 days after a 
128 nanogram result is simply the product of residue from 
previous marijuana use, or residue combined with passive 
inhalation. The Board of Review decision therefore is not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
In addition, the Board of Review similarly disregarded 
competent evidence from an unbiased expert. At the Board of 
Review's request, the ALJ called Dr. Ellwood L. Loveridge to 
offer expert testimony on the drug test results. Dr. Loveridge 
testified he did not study drug screening in school, but had 
since studied drug testing at seminars and through private 
reading. Remand, pg. 15. He testified his office had done a 
number of marijuana tests. Dr. Loveridge testified "there is a 
lot of controversy on how long marijuana stays in the body. 
Remand, pg. 16. He testified that the Health Department had 
conducted anonymous studies in which credibility is likely to be 
very high. Remand, pg. 28. He testified: 
But we have had people who have tested as high as Mr. 
Johnson did in the 120's who have been positive for 
three months afterwards and are anxious to get it down 
because they have been going to take a test with an 
employer. And so they have asked if I knew of any way 
to speed up its elimination and I don't know of any 
way. It is fat soluble and it does take a long time to 
get metabolized and excreted. But we have had them for 
over three months still testing above our threshold 
which is 25. And it doesn't come down in a straight 
line. They will test one time at 120 and the next time 
at 100 and the next, three or four days later it will 
15 
test back up at 115. 
Remandf pg. 28. As to passive inhalation, Dr. Loveridge 
testified: 
Now again, I have to preface it with a, we don't have 
the money nor the interest to do the publishable type 
study that would be nice to have. We are not going to 
do it. But passive inhalation, I think has been done 
mostly with people who haven't had marijuana and then 
they put them in a room with others who are smoking, or 
in a closed car, and measure their levels. But a 
person who has smoked has a base line that is higher 
than a non-smoker. And it doesn't take many nanograms 
for a person who has a base line of 18 to test positive 
with the EMIT system. And so I think passive 
inhalation has been given the wrong credit because we 
have tested it with non-users and when we try and 
extract those results to users, they are not 
legitimate. So I think passive inhalation is a factor, 
or can be a factor in a person who has a residual, 
marijuana layer, in their body so to speak. 
Remand, pg. 30. 
Thus, Dr. Loveridge's independent, unbiased testimony 
clearly supports Johnson's assertion that Johnson's 25 nanogram 
test was the result of residue from his use of marijuana prior to 
his first Morton Thiokol drug test, or the result of residue plus 
passive inhalation. The Board of Review, however, did not 
consider Loveridge's testimony. 
Claimant's counsel had initially raised an objection to Dr. 
Loveridge's qualification as an expert. The Board of Review 
granted that motion and disregarded Dr. Loveridge's testimony. 
Johnson's counsel however, made his objection before Dr. 
Loveridge had testified. Once Dr. Loveridge testified, it became 
clear he was a qualified expert and gave competent testimony. An 
expert witness is one who is "qualified as an expert by 
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knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education . . ." Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702. Dr. Loveridge's salient, insightful 
answers at the Hearing clearly show he meets this minimal 
standard. Certainly compared to Dr. Kerr, whose expert testimony 
was allowed, Dr. Loveridge was a qualified expert. Once accepted 
as an expert, the credibility of his testimony may of course be 
weighed just as is done with any other witness. The Board of 
Review erred in not considering his testimony, and instead 
fashioning a ruling on flawed testimony without the substance to 
support its decision. 
The sum of the testimony before the Board of Review was 
therefore as follows. Marijuana clearly is detectable in the 
urine for long periods of time. Morton Thiokol's test does not 
show how long before the test was administered the subject used 
marijuana. A past chronic user of marijuana may have a base line 
amount of marijuana in his system that is fairly high, so he is 
much more likely than one who has never used marijuana to show 
positive after being subjected to passive inhalation. Finally, 
Johnson testified emphatically that he had not used marijuana 
since his first Morton Thiokol drug test. The ALT who witnessed 
Johnson's testimony found Johnson to be credible. The weight of 
evidence, therefore, weighs in favor of Johnson's assertions. 
The evidence on which the Board of Review relied lacks the 
substance to support its decision. Therefore, if Johnson had not 
smoked marijuana after the first test as the evidence supports, 
he was not fired for just cause and should be allowed 
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unemployment compensation. 
Not only was the Board of Review decision not based on 
substantial evidence, it also was not "reasonable or rational." 
Sevier County Board of Education v. Board of Review, 701 P.2d 
1064, 1067 (Utah 1985). First, the mere numbers of the test 
results compel the conclusion that Johnson had ceased marijuana 
use. Second, the Board of Review's decision that even passive 
inhalation is sufficient grounds for denial is plainly 
irrational. Finally, off the job marijuana use should be no 
concern of Morton Thiokol's or at least no concern of the 
Department of Unemployment Security in granting unemployment 
compensation. 
Johnson first tested positive at 128 nanograms. 65 days 
later he tested at 25 nanograms. This is a 500% reduction in 65 
days. A positive result is 20 nanograms, so Johnson was just 
barely positive. Given the uncertainty about the length of time 
marijuana remains in the body, logic dictates that Johnson's 2 5 
nanogram test was the result of residue from marijuana use prior 
to his first test. Additionally, Johnson testified he was 
subject to passive inhalation of his roommates' smoke. The 
marijuana from this passive inhalation would combine with 
Johnson's base line residue to produce an even higher result. 
Logic and reason compel the conclusion that Johnson's barely 
positive test result was not the product of continued marijuana 
use but the product of factors completely beyond his control. 
Second, the Board of Review held that even passive 
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inhalation of other's marijuana smoke is no less "culpable or 
harmful in its effect than direct inhalation of marijuana smoke*" 
Board of Review Decision No. 88-BR-428, pg. 4. Thus, mere 
association with marijuana users would be sufficient grounds for 
denial of unemployment compensation. It is patently absurd that 
an employee may be discharged and denied unemployment 
compensation based on violation of an employer's drug policy 
without having used the drug. The Board of Review's holding that 
passive inhalation is sufficient grounds for denial of 
unemployment compensation is plainly unreasonable. 
Finally, as the ALJ held, "[t]he claimant's activities while 
off the job, however, should be of no concern to the employer 
unless it is shown his job performance is negatively impacted." 
ALJ Dec, pg 3. Johnson was initially tested because of an 
automobile accident that was determined to not be his fault. 
Hearing, pg. 5. Morton Thiokol made no claim that Johnson used 
marijuana on the job or reported to work under its influence. 
Hearing, pp. 9-10. Morton Thiokol's representative testified 
that Johnson was a satisfactory employee. Hearing, pg. 9. He 
was discharged solely on the basis of his positive drug test. 
Hearing, pg. 5. The Board of Review thus denied unemployment 
compensation to a satisfactory employee, discharged for conduct 
with no relation whatsoever to his job or job performance. That 
is plainly irrational and unreasonable. 
The Board of Review's decision is not supported by 
substantial evidence, and ignored credible, compelling evidence 
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to the contrary. The Board of Review decision denied simple 
logic, and is plainly irrational and unreasonable. This Court 
should therefore reverse the Board of Review and allow benefits 
as determined by the Administrative Law Judge, 
B. THE BOARD OF REVIEW ACTED ARBITRARILY IN ISSUING A 
DECISION CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
established an analysis for Boards of Review to follow in 
determining an applicant's qualification for unemployment 
compensation. Logan Regional Hospital v. Board of Review, 723 
P.2d 427 (Utah 1986); Champlin v. Board of Review, 744 P.2d 330 
(Utah Ct, App. 1987)• The Board of Review arbitrarily ignored 
these precedents and the analysis they require in denying Johnson 
benefits• Application of Johnson's case to the analysis 
established by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court compels 
reversal of the Board of Review decision• 
It is well settled that not every ground for termination of 
employment is a ground for denial of unemployment compensation. 
Champlin, 744 P.2d at 331; Logan Hospital, 723 P.2d at 429; 
Sevier County Board of Education v. Board of Review, 701 P.2d 
1064, 1068 (Utah 1985). Private employers such as Morton Thiokol 
have almost plenary discretion to hire and fire, except as 
controlled by collective bargaining agreements, employment 
contracts and state and federal anti-discrimination laws. The 
State of Utah, however, in considering claims for unemployment 
compensation through the Department of Employment Security, may 
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not act arbitrarily, but must act rationally and reasonably. 
This means the Department of Employment Security and its Boards 
of Review must act in accord with the statutes and rules that 
control them, and in accord with cases interpreting those 
statutes and rules. Unemployment compensation may only be denied 
an otherwise qualified claimant on a showing that the employee 
was at fault as defined by Utah Code Ann. Section 35-4-5(b)(1) 
and cases that interpret that section. 
Unemployment compensation may only be denied an otherwise 
qualified applicant if: 
the claimant was discharged for just cause, or for an 
act or omission in connection with employment, not 
constituting a crime, which was deliberate, wilful or 
wanton, and adverse to the employees rightful interest, 
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1) (emphasis added); Logan Hospital, 
723 P.2d at 429-30; Champlin, 744 P.2d at 330-32. That statute 
has been interpreted to require fault of the employee, based on a 
three part showing of the employee's culpability, knowledge and 
control. Champlin, 744 P.2d at 331. 
Culpability for purposes of that standard is explained in 
the Unemployment Insurance Rules of the Utah Department of 
Employment Security as follows: 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity 
of the offense as it affects continuance of the 
employment relationship. The discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the 
employers rightful interests. A discharge would not 
be considered "necessary" if it is not consistent with 
reasonable employment practices. The wrongness of the 
conduct must be considered in the context of the 
particular employment and how it affects the employer's 
rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of 
poor judgment and there is no expectation that the 
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conduct will be continued or repeated potential harm 
may not be shown and therefore it is not necessary 
to discharge the employee. 
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(l) para. Bl (1986) cited in 
Champ1in, 744 P.2d at 332 (emphasis added). 
To justify a denial of benefits, therefore, the conduct 
giving rise to the termination must have been committed on the 
job or have impacted job performance. Champ1in, 744 P.2d at 331. 
In Champlin, the claimant had worked alone at a job with a great 
deal of responsibility. Champlin Petroleum v. Dept. of 
Employment Security, 744 P.2d 330, 330-31 (Utah Ct. App.1987). 
After years of successful job performance the claimant suffered a 
mental breakdown caused by a mental illness, the symptoms of 
which were exacerbated by claimant's marijuana use. On the 
claimant's return to work his doctor recommended that he be 
supervised on the job for a time. Because his job required him 
to work alone he was discharged. The claimant was granted 
unemployment compensation and the employer appealed. 
The Champlin claimant testified that he smoked marijuana 
twice a week for some time while he worked for the Champlin 
employer. There was no evidence that he used marijuana on the 
job or reported to work under its influence. The claimant's 
supervisor testified that the claimant had been a satisfactory 
employee. The Champlin Court found that "any exacerbation of his 
mental problems from his use of marijuana did not rise to the 
level of fault essential to establish just cause and deny him 
unemployment benefits." Champlin, 744 P.2d at 333. 
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In the present action there was no evidence that Johnson 
smoked marijuana on the job, was impaired by the drug on the job, 
or acted in any other way contrary to Morton Thiokol's rightful 
interests. Hearing, pp. 8-11. In fact, Morton Thiokol made no 
claim that Johnson acted against Morton Thiokol's interest in any 
way. Id. at pp. 8-9. In Champlin, the claimant's off the job 
marijuana use exacerbated a mental illness which was the cause of 
the claimant's inability to work and the reason he was ultimately 
fired. Here, Johnson's marijuana use had absolutely no impact on 
his job performance or his ability to continue as a satisfactory 
employee of Morton Thiokol. Johnson, even more than the Champlin 
claimant, thus lacked the culpability necessary for a denial of 
unemployment compensation. 
The uncontroverted testimony before the Board of Review was 
that Johnson used no marijuana after the first positive test. 
Nonetheless, from a cold record without the benefit of witnessing 
Johnson's examination, the Board of Review found that testimony 
to not be credible and assumed Johnson had continued to use 
marijuana. Board of Review Decision No. 88-BR-428, pp. 3-4. 
However, even if Johnson had used marijuana off the job, in a way 
which did not impair his job performance, Champlin compels the 
conclusion that Johnson would lack the culpability necessary for 
a denial of unemployment compensation. 
The Board of Review did not find that Johnson's marijuana 
use impaired his job performance, or that Johnson used marijuana 
on the job or reported for work under influence of the drug. 
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Rather, the Board of Review found that any presence of marijuana 
sufficient to test positive under Morton Thiokol's standard for 
any reason was sufficiently adverse to Morton Thiokol's interest 
to warrant termination for just cause and denial of benefits• 
88-BR-428, pg. 4. The Board went so far as to hold that even if 
the presence of the drug was a result of passive inhalation from 
others, it would be sufficient to deny Johnson his unemployment 
benefits• Id, As discussed above this ignores logic and reason, 
but it also ignores the clear precedent established by this Court 
and the Utah Supreme Court. The logic of Champ1in is intact, and 
its application is fair and reasonable. The Board of Review's 
arbitrary departure from Champlin's reasoning is itself 
sufficient grounds for reversal. 
The second necessary element of a claimant's fault is 
knowledge that the conduct will likely result in termination. 
Champ1in, 744 P.2d at 331; Grinnell v. Board of Review, 732 
P.2d 113, 114 (Utah 1987); Green v. Board of Review, 728 P.2d 
966 (Utah 1986). Such knowledge "may not be established unless 
the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior." 
Green. 728 P.2d at 998. Here, Johnson understood that a second 
positive test would likely result in termination, but he was not 
given an explanation of what a positive test level actually was, 
or the conduct that would likely result in a positive test. As 
discussed at length elsewhere in this brief, Johnson's 
uncontroverted testimony was that he did not smoke marijuana 
after the first test but was subject to passive inhalation. 
24 
Hearing, pp. 12-13. It is highly unlikely that Johnson 
understood passive inhalation could result in a positive test and 
subject him to termination. Another likely explanation for the 
second test result was the lingering presence of marijuana in his 
system. Dr. Loveridge testified that test subjects with 
marijuana levels similar to Johnsons tested positive up to 120 
days after discontinued use. Remand, pg. 28. Another 
independent tests show positive tests for marijuana 81 days after 
ingestion. National Law Journal, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set 
for a Dramatic Legal Collision. Vol. 8, No. 29, Mon. 4/7/86. 
Because Johnson used no marijuana after the first test, he 
committed no conduct which he knew would likely result in 
termination. Johnson therefore lacks the required element of 
knowledge that the conduct for which he was fired would likely 
result in termination. 
Finally, the conduct for which the claimant was fired must 
have been in the claimant's control. Champlin, 744 P.2d at 331-
32. Here, as discussed above, the uncontroverted testimony was 
that the presence of marijuana in Johnson's system was due to 
factors totally outside his control. Johnson testified that if 
there was marijuana in his system it must have been from his 
passive inhalation of his roommates' daily marijuana use. 
Hearing, pp. 12-13. The other logical explanation for the 
positive test was the residue of marijuana in his system from 
previous use. Certainly Johnson had no control over the speed at 
which his body rid itself of the drug. Thus Johnson had no 
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control over the small amount of marijuana in his system which 
caused the positive test and his termination from Morton Thiokol. 
Johnson therefore lacked the culpability, knowledge and 
control necessary for a rightful denial of unemployment 
compensation. The Board of Review did not follow the analysis 
established by this Court, but instead ruled that any positive 
test for marijuana is grounds for denial of unemployment 
benefits, regardless of the claimant's culpability, knowledge and 
control. This ignores logic, rationality, fairness and the Board 
of Review's obligation to act in accord with standards set by 
established precedent. This arbitrary Board of Review action 
should be reversed. 
C* THE BOARD OF REVIEW VIOLATED STATE AND FEDERAL 
GUARANTEES OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE IAWS 
The Board of Review's decision violates state and federal 
equal protection. Article I, Section 2 4 of the Utah State 
Constitution provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation." The Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution prohibits states from denying to "any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
These Constitutional guarantees may be violated both in enacting 
statutes and rules, and in their execution by government 
officials. Arrinqton v. Mass. Bay Transit Authority, 306 F.Supp. 
1355, 1353 (D.Mass. 1969). Administrative bodies are subject to 
the limitations of equal protection. Hennessey v. Ind. School 
Di^t.. 552 P.2d 1141, 1152 (Okl. 1976). Here, the Board of 
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Review's flawed application of an otherwise constitutionally 
valid statute violated equal protection. 
Equal protection requires a two part analysis. First, 
"classifications and the different treatment given the classes 
must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to 
further the objectives of the statute." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661f 670 (Utah 1984); State Tax Commission v. Dept. of Finance, 
576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978). Under both state and federal law, a 
"classification must rest upon some difference which bears a 
reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the 
classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and 
without any such basis." Malan, 693 P.2d at 672 quoting 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
Here, the Board of Review's decision has the effect of 
creating a separate class of all employees fired for positive 
drug tests whose drug use does not relate to work performance. 
All other claimants will be reviewed under the culpability, 
knowledge and control standard applied in Champlin. Those, such 
as Johnson, with positive drug tests will be denied compensation 
merely on the result of the test, despite the many circumstances 
which may give rise to a positive test, and despite the fact that 
any drug use may have had no negative impact on the employer. 
This simply has no rational and just relationship to the purpose 
of the unemployment compensation statutes and rules. 
The purpose of the Employment Security Act and the relative 
departmental rules is to determine the eligibility of claimants, 
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and to affect the distribution of benefits to those qualified. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-2. Those claimants who are shown to have 
been fired for just cause for job related misconduct will be 
rightfully denied benefits, and those who were not fired for just 
cause within the meaning of the statute will be allowed to 
benefit from the ameliorative effects of unemployment 
compensation. The distinction drawn by the Board of Review bears 
no rational relation to that purpose, so the class lines drawn by 
the Board of Review decision are impermissibly narrow. 
The only class which may be fashioned with a rational 
relationship to the purposes of the Employment Security Act is 
the class comprised of all employees, otherwise qualified, who 
are challenged as having been terminated for just cause. Having 
thus defined the class, the applicable statutes and rules as they 
have been interpreted may be applied to individual cases to 
determine qualified applicants. Johnson and others similarly 
situated are members of that class, and must be treated in parity 
with other class members. 
Second,shaving defined the class, the law must be applied 
equally to all class members. Maian, 693 P.2d at 670; State Tax 
Commission, 576 P.2d at 1298. Disparate treatment of class 
members must be rationally related to the purpose of the statute. 
Id* "When persons are similarly situated, it is unconstitutional 
to single out one person or group of persons from among a larger 
class on the basis of a tenuous justification that has little or 
no merit." Malan, 693 P.2d at 671; See Dodge Town Inc. v. Romney, 
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480 P.2d 461 (Utah 1961). 
Here, all other members of the class are judged on a 
standard which requires some conduct of the claimant which 
injured the employer in its business, i.e., some job related 
conduct. To deny benefits to Johnson for conduct not related to 
the job is an irrational distinction not related to the purpose 
of the statute. The purpose of the Employment Security Act is to 
determine the qualification of claimants to receive unemployment 
compensation and to distribute those benefits to qualified 
claimants. Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-2. Unemployment compensation 
is an ameliorative measure which should be liberally construed to 
achieve its purpose. Logan Hospital, 723 P.2d at 429. Rather, 
in its decision the Board of Review references the purposes of 
the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, to create a drug free work 
force and quality products. Board of Review Decision 88-BR-428, 
pg. 3; See Utah Code Ann. § 34-38-1. The Drug and Alcohol 
Testing Act, however, was not passed to determine the 
qualification of applicants for unemployment compensation, and is 
not rationally related to that end. We must assume the Drug and 
Alcohol Testing Act will achieve its purpose without the 
misplaced aid of the Industrial Commission Board of Review. The 
objectives and means of the Employment Security Act must guide 
the Boards of Review in determining awards of unemployment 
compensation. To follow another purpose is arbitrary and 
irrational and violates equal protection. 
Johnson is similarly situated with all other applicants 
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otherwise qualified to receive unemployment compensation. If his 
qualification is challenged, he must be reviewed under the same 
standard applicable to all other members of his class, the 
standard of fault applied in Champlin and other cases. There is 
no reason rationally related to the purpose of the Employment 
Security Act which justifies the Board of Review's departure from 
that true course. 
D. THE BOARD OF REVIEW DECISION VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution 
provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." The Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution similarly imposes on states the 
same obligation. Stated simply, substantive due process protects 
individuals from arbitrary action of state administrative 
agencies. Wilwording v. Swenson, 502 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(disciplinary action of the Missouri State Penitentiary). The 
Utah Supreme Court stated in relation to agency action: "If the 
act operates equally and affords freedom from arbitrary action it 
satisfies the requirements of substantive due process. Due 
process may be characterized as a standard of reasonableness." 
Mineer v. Board of Review, 572 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Utah 1977). The 
rights secured by substantive due process may be violated be 
enacting a violative statute, or by flawed construction or 
application of a statute valid on its face. Qnev v. Oklahoma 
City, 120 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir. 1941); See T.R.F. v. Falan. 
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760 P.2d 906, 914-15 (Utah App. 1988) (statutory scheme 
constitutional but application by court violated due process). 
Here, the Board of Review's arbitrary and unreasonable denial of 
Johnson's unemployment compensation violates due process. 
First, the effect of the Board of Review decision is to deny 
benefits to one who has taken no affirmative act in derogation of 
his right to benefits, Johnson's uncontroverted testimony was 
that he tested positive as a result of passive inhalation of 
others' marijuana smoke or as a result of residue. The Board of 
Review found that if passive inhalation were sufficient to 
register a positive test it would be sufficient cause for a 
denial of benefits. Thus mere association with marijuana users 
is sufficient grounds for denial of unemployment compensation. 
That is arbitrary and unreasonable and a denial of due process. 
Further, as discussed in relation to equal protection, 
Johnson was denied unemployment compensation for conduct wholly 
unrelated to his job performance. Although such conduct may be 
sufficient grounds for termination by a private employer, it is 
not a sufficient basis to deny Johnson unemployment compensation. 
To deny benefits to Johnson for conduct not related to his job 
performance or the interest of the employer is arbitrary, 
irrational and unrelated to the purpose of the Employment 
Security Act. 
Finally, the Board of Review singled out Johnson for a 
denial of benefits in contradiction of established precedent. 
Although a Morton Thiokol employee might understand that off the 
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job marijuana use may subject him to loss of his job, Johnson 
could not have known that such conduct would subject him to loss 
of his unemployment benefits because the established law was 
contrary. If the Board had properly applied the three prong test 
of Champlin it would have found in favor of Johnson and allowed 
benefits. The Board of Review's failure to properly apply 
applicable law is arbitrary, unreasonable, and a violation of due 
process. 
The Board of Review's decision, therefore, is arbitrary and 
unreasonable of its own logic. It also has no rational relation 
to the purpose of the Employment Security Act which it purports 
to apply. It therefore violates Johnson's rights protected by 
substantive due process and must be overturned. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Board of Review's decision to reverse the award of 
benefits by the Administrative Law Judge should be overturned by 
this Court and remanded to the Board of Review to reinstate the 
prior award of unemployment compensation. The Board's decision 
is not based on substantial evidence, nor are its conclusions 
rational or reasonable. It blatantly disregards established 
precedent of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. It violates 
equal protection because its ruling applies to an impermissibly 
narrow class, or because it singles out a group within an 
appropriate class for grossly disparate treatment. Finally, it 
violates substantive due process because it applies the 
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Employment Security Act in a manner with no reasonable relation 
to that Act's purpose. This Court, therefore, should overturn 
the Board of Review's decision and order the Board of Review to 
reinstate Claimant's award of unemployment compensation. 
DATED this 15th day of March, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
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